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May 27, 2014  
 
Abstract 
This paper takes a performance-based approach to corporate governance and investigates 
whether compliance with the corporate governance code in Sweden equates to a lower cost of 
capital, measured as cost of equity, cost of debt and the weighted average of these, the 
WACC. The premonition is that adherence to governance codes should lower the risk profile 
of the firm, leading investors and creditors to requiring a lower premium to associate 
themselves with the firm financially. Previous studies, e.g. Bozec & Bozec, (2010), Pham et 
al, (2012) and Zhu, (2009) have established a significant relationship between the variables, 
although one has to be aware of the strong possibility of the presence of endogeneity. To 
overcome this problem, this study utilizes instrumental variables, as well as running the tests 
in a two-stage least-square framework with fixed-effects. A further distinction is also made 
by testing if SMEs have a larger relative gain of governance than large-cap listed peers. The 
findings are that there are financial advantages to compliance with governance. Specifically, 
board composition and nomination committee shows to have a significant lowering effect on 
the cost of capital for the whole population, being all listed companies in Sweden for the 
years 2008-2013. Furthermore, the relative gain is somewhat higher for SMEs compared to 
larger companies.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Sweden, Compliance, Performance, Cost of Capital, Cost of 
Equity, Cost of Debt, Board Composition, Audit Committee, Nomination Committee, Remuneration 
Committee    
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1 Introduction  
Corporate governance systems exist in order to ensure reliable markets for investors and 
other parties involved (Tengblad, 2004; CG code, 2010). It is serves as a mechanism to 
mitigate agency risks attributable to separation of ownership and control. However, the 
description could also be to ensure accountability toward in-direct societal stakeholders, 
through implementation of CSR efforts. Whichever one most correct, the subject has been 
under constant development since the implementation of the first framework in the 1990’s 
(Tricker, 2012). In essence, governance has the ability to limit managerial opportunistic 
behavior, as well as securing the quality of information flowing from the corporation (Ramly 
& Rashid, 2010).  
In Sweden, and many other places in Europe and the world, adherence to governance means 
complying with discretionary codes of best practice. Each company that is subject to the 
codes can choose to either comply, or if they choose not to, provide an explanation. The 
present framework of corporate governance codes in Sweden came in effect in 2008 and 
includes both broad and specific dictations, for example, concerning board independence, the 
notion of including committees and securing the independence of these. Overall, the aim of 
the framework is to increase confidence and secure the supply of risk capital (CG code, 2010).   
As explained in Ramly & Rashid (2010), firms with robust monitoring devices, i.e. high 
adherence to governance, should have a lower risk for managerial abuse and better resource 
allocation. Therefore, such a firm should have lower risk and consequently access to cheaper 
capital (Love, 2005). In fact, previous studies have established such a connection. Studying 
the Australian-, Canadian- and American markets between the years 1993-2005, Pham et al, 
(2012), Bozec & Bozec, (2010), Ashbaugh et al, (2004) and Zhu (2009), among others, find 
that the cost of capital is a decreasing function of corporate governance activities and quality.  
Building on these papers and methodologies, this thesis will take a similar, performance-
based view of corporate governance and investigate whether compliance with the Swedish 
corporate governance code has a decreasing effect on the cost structure of Swedish listed 
companies between the years 2008 and 2013. The first Swedish corporate governance code 
came into force in 2005, with the revised version being implemented in 2008. Thus, to the 
author’s knowledge, there has been no study on the current corporate governance framework, 
and specifically its effect on the cost structure of Swedish firms. A review of the current 
corporate governance code follows in the next section. The tests will focus on four groups of 
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governance variables, namely board composition, audit committee-, nomination committee- 
and remuneration committee composition and independence.  
In addition, an attempt is made to make a distinction of performance within the population. 
The objective will also be to investigate whether the relative gain of governance is larger for 
small- and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) compared to large-cap listed companies. As 
SME’s face the same exhortations as larger corporations, but are significantly smaller in 
terms of revenue, market capitalization etc., the relative cost of compliance per every SEK 
revenue are higher for these companies. Simply put, the relative effort to comply could be 
viewed as greater for SME’s rather than larger firms (Nedelchev, 2013). Consequently, one of 
the targets of this thesis is to investigate whether such a result can be found.   
The findings of this study can help to understand the performance of the corporate 
governance system in Sweden and be interesting for managers in general, and specifically 
when both developing a governance- and a financial strategy.  
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether there are financial advantages associated 
with adhering to corporate governance codes by testing the premonition that complying 
companies have lower cost of capital than non-complying peers. In order to fulfill the 
purpose, the following researched questions are stated: 
 Are there financial advantages to compliance with corporate governance codes in 
Sweden? 
 Are these advantages larger for SMEs rather than large cap listed companies? 
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The thesis is structured as follows: 
 
 
Table 1: Structure of the thesis and description of the chapter 
 
 
 
 
  
Content
2 Definitions
This chapter describes general definitions of parts of the thesis that need further
explanations. It includes definitions regarding the grouping of the companies and the
control variables.
3 Framework and Previous Research
This chapter describes the previous research in the field of Corporate Governance.
Further, a discussion of previous findings and its shortcomings will be held. As
Corporate Governance is a relatively new topic in Sweden, the expectation is to
find limited previous research in a Swedish context.
4 Methodology
This chapter describes the tests and data for the purpose of this thesis. Later
chapters will include previous research in this field and describe the models applied.
5
Hypotheses 
Development
This chapter describes the development of four different hypotheses regarding
complying with corporate governance codes that will be tested in chapter 6. 
6 Estimation Results 
and Analysis
This chapter starts with the descriptive statistics of this thesis. Furthermore, it shows 
the results of the regressions and analyses the outcomes. It further gives
explanations regarding those results. A summary of the significant results can be
observed in table 6. The structure of this chapter is following the order used in
chapter 5.
7 Conclusion
The final chapter of this thesis summarizes the findings in the analysis and concludes
the results. It further shows fields where future research should be conducted in the
future.
Chapter
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1.2 Background  
1.2.1 Corporate Governance Code in Sweden 
Corporate Governance codes in Sweden are applied through a discretionary method of 
comply-or-explain, meaning that each company listed in Sweden can individually choose to 
apply the codes of best practice. This means that it is a self-regulated structure which serves 
to complement legislation and other corporate governance rules set out by Companies Act, 
the Annual Accounts Act, the stock exchange regulation and statements from the Swedish 
Securities Counsel. If a company decides not to comply with the principles stated in 
guidelines, the reason should be disclosed in their financial reports. According to the Swedish 
corporate governance code, the aim of guidelines is to ensure that companies are run as 
efficient as possible. Also, its objective is to secure the confidence of the shareholders and 
other potential investors, so that risk capital can flow into organizations and markets in an 
unhindered manner. Any company that is listed on a regulated market in Sweden is subject to 
the following corporate governance codes depicted in broad terms (CG code, 2010). See 
appendix E for a detailed review of the code.  
1.2.2 The Shareholders’ Meeting 
The shareholders’ meeting is the company’s highest decision-making body, and should create 
conditions so that shareholders can exercise their right to be active. The information 
regarding the meeting should be presented to shareholders as soon as time and venue have 
been decided, as well as in such fashion that the shareholders are given adequate time to 
prepare. Further, the meeting should be attended by the company chairman, the CEO and, if 
possible, all the members of the board. At least one member from the nomination committee 
and one of the auditors should be present. The minutes from the meeting should be posted on 
the company website following the meeting (CG code, 2010).  
1.2.3 The board of Directors and Their Duties 
The chair of the board has the outmost responsibility of the board of directors and should 
therefore ensure that the directors fulfill its responsibilities and that the work is conducted in 
an efficient manner. The board’s tasks also consist of ensuring that adequate systems for 
internal control and financial reporting are in place, as well as producing the appropriate 
financial reports. In the absence of such internal auditing systems, the justification and 
general need for it should be evaluated annually and stated in the reports. The work of the 
board and the CEO should also be evaluated annually and presented in a structured and 
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systematic manner, and presented to the nomination committee for its consideration (CG 
code, 2010).  
1.2.4 The Composition of the Board of Directors 
The board should have a composition corresponding to the phase or circumstances of the 
company and should also promote diversity and equal gender representation. Only one 
member of the board should also be a member of the executive management. Overall, the aim 
is for the members to be in a position of independence toward the company and the executive 
management. The level of independence is assessed through employment history at the 
company, as well as any other contractual or compensational relationship with the company 
in question. Also, if the person has any direct- or indirect ties, family or otherwise, with the 
company is considered. In addition to the above mentioned, at least two of the management 
and company independent directors should also be independent of the company’s 
shareholders. In order to assess such independence, the director’s relationship with the 
shareholders should be considered. For example, a member that has a contractual relationship 
with a company that is a major shareholder in the company in question is not deemed 
independent (CG code, 2010).  
1.2.5 Committees 
The corporate governance code states that the company should have a nomination committee 
that has the objective to propose candidates for the role of chair, members of the board and 
auditor, as well as remuneration for those candidates. The committee should have at least 
three members, of which the majority should be independent of the company and the 
management. Neither the CEO nor members from the management are to be members of the 
committee. In addition, at least one member should be independent toward the company’s 
majority shareholder. The second committee is the remuneration committee that is 
responsible for deciding on remuneration issues. In line with the nomination committee 
should the members be independent of the management and the company in general, however, 
it can be chaired by the chairman of the company. If the board deems it appropriate, the tasks 
of the remuneration committee can be performed by the board, given the condition of no 
involvement by an executive management director. Lastly, the audit committee should 
comprise of no fewer than three members. The details regarding independence and the 
composition are the same as with the other committees (CG code, 2010). 
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1.2.6 Disclosure of Corporate Governance  
In the event of non-compliance of a section of the code, the company should clearly disclose 
the reason and which measures they have taken instead. Also, information should be 
presented regarding, for example members of the board of directors, the composition, the 
division of work, the committees, attendance of meetings and detailed information regarding 
the CEO. The company website should include a section of corporate governance (CG code, 
2010). 
1.3 Philosophies of Corporate Governance 
1.3.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory views governance issues from a perspective of a principal and agent, where 
the first is a term for the shareholders and the latter a denotation of the director. The theory 
assumes that the agent is a utility maximizing individual that seeks to expropriate from the 
shareholders in order to gain as much as possible herself. The behavior is possibly due to 
information asymmetry between the shareholder and the director. The costs that arise from 
minimizing this sort of activities are called agency costs. As stated in Tricker (2008), 
evidence of behavior in line with the principal-agent description is not hard to find 
empirically. It is also an issue that has increased with the growing dispersion of ownership in 
some economies, as each individual shareholder has limited insight into the operations of the 
company. Much of the governance codes and legislation across the world are in place to 
mitigate to possibility of agency issues (Tricker, 2008).  
1.3.2 Stewardship Theory 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory takes a less immoral point of view. The 
theory points to the director as having a sole assignment, which is the legal foundation of 
shareholder protection. The shareholders elect directors to serve on the board of directors that 
should serve according to their interest in every aspect. Stewardship theory recognizes the 
need to identify other stakeholders of the firm, but the primary loyalty should be toward the 
shareholders. In fact, the theory states that the other stakeholders (e.g. employees, suppliers 
etc.) have their interest protected by law (Tricker, 2008). 
1.3.3 Transaction Cost Economies 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) stems from work by Coase in the 1930’s, and concerns 
itself with managerial discretion when it comes to how to govern operations. Firms exist in 
  
17 Schmidt, Swärdh (2014): Corporate Governance in Sweden – A Success Story? 
order to minimize transaction costs. Coase recognized that a firm could save costs by 
producing in-house rather than outside of the organization, i.e. the assumption of efficient 
markets break down. Building on the work of Coarse, Williamson (2007) provides additional 
thoughts on TCE stating the reasons as to why markets break down. The cognitive limitations 
of humans provides for bounded rationality, as well as opportunistic behavior and tendency 
for expropriation. In addition, problems with specificity, frequency and uncertainty create 
market inefficiency (Tricker, 2008).    
1.3.4 Stakeholder Theory 
As one might suspect from the notation, the implication of stakeholder theory is to adhere to 
all those actors or parties affected by the decisions of the company, for example including 
customers and the community where the company is active. In some parts of the world, the 
approach to take all stakeholders into consideration is normative, as it is included in 
legislation or the corporate governance codes. In other places, it is still up to managerial 
discretion to include it or not. The challenge in taking such an approach is that the companies 
no longer just have a single stakeholder, the shareholders, to satisfy. Instead, it demands a 
balance between the needs and wants of all those affected or involved. As a response to the 
critics of stakeholder theory, enlightened shareholder value prescribes a path where devotion 
to stakeholders creates shareholder value. The idea is that only by considering all the 
stakeholders can a corporation create long term sustainable value. (Tricker, 2008).  
1.3.5 Resource Dependency Theory 
The resource dependency theory sees the board of directors as a linchpin, situated 
strategically in-between the company and the market. The idea is that the directors should 
provide connections to resources that the company might need. For example, the board could 
arrange connections with potential customers or suppliers or give access to sources of capital 
(Tricker, 2008).  
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2 Definitions  
This chapter describes general definitions of parts of the thesis that need further explanations. 
It includes definitions regarding the grouping of the companies and the control variables. 
 
Large-cap companies in this thesis are defined as companies that have a market value of 
equity over one billion Euro1, which is in accordance to the definition of Nasdaq OMX 
Nordic. As of 25 May 2014, the exchange rate between the Euro and the Swedish Kronor 
(SEK) is 9.05542, which leads to large cap companies being defined as companies with a 
market value over SEK 9.0554bn. On the other side, SMEs are defined as companies that 
have a market value of equity smaller than SEK 9.0554bn.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 As of 25th  May 2014. 
2
 Source: Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=EURSEK=X (accessed on: 25th May 2014). 
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3 Framework and Previous Research  
This chapter describes the previous research in the field of Corporate Governance. Further, 
a discussion of previous findings and its shortcomings will be held. As Corporate 
Governance is a relatively new topic in Sweden, the expectation is to find limited previous 
research in a Swedish context. 
3.1 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Governance serves to mitigate the agency problem that can arise from the separation of 
ownership and control. Better monitoring devices mitigates the risk of management 
expropriation. One such device is the board of directors. Owners appoint directors to serve in 
their interest and to maximize value (Aguilera, 2005). The board hire and monitor 
management, whom in turn are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the firm. 
Empirically, though, the results are not always significant (Soh, 2011). Therefore, there are 
additional governance mechanisms within the board of directors that aim to minimize the risk 
of a system breakdown, namely the size and composition. The board should comprise of 
independent directors, which serve to mitigate the risk that personal interests interfere with 
the best interest of the corporation. The belief is also that an independent director can 
evaluate management in a more impartial manner. Bednar (2012) criticizes the concept of 
formal board independence, instead suggesting that a board might not be independent due to 
social factors. The idea is that other influences such as demographic similarity and informal 
relationships can interfere with the independence.  
The size-factor of a board alleviates, for example, the risk that any director should act in a 
dominating manner (Ramly & Rashid, 2010). Furthermore, the board should also consist of 
remuneration-, audit- and nomination committees, responsible for ensuring adequate and fair 
managerial remuneration, the quality and independent result of the audit and recruitment of 
directors (Tricker, 2012). The specific details regarding the rules of the committees differ 
from country to country. However, the fundamental implication is to safeguard from 
expropriation in various ways. The remuneration committee should comprise independent 
members so that compensation is fair and grounded in performance (Clifford & Evans, 1996). 
Effective compensation systems should incentivize performance that does not create 
opportunistic and harmful behaviour (Ramly & Rashid, 2010). Likewise, the independence of 
the audit committee is paramount in order to guarantee the quality and correctness of the 
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audit activities. Lastly, the nomination committee should strive to make the nomination of 
management and directors a respectable process (Tricker, 2012).  
The ownership structure of a firm is a strong governance device. Owners with a substantial 
stake, i.e. institutional shareholders and family-owners, can easily influence the management 
and the company direction. As block-holders generally are more interested in long-term 
success of the company, they can diminish any risk of managerial short-termism. Thus, the 
chance of a greater alignment of the owners and managers interests is significant. However, 
the agency problem could, in such a context, shift from the classic owner-manager conflict to 
instead incorporate minority- and majority shareholders (Ramly & Rashid, 2010). The board 
independence is even more important in that respect. Overall, governance devices have been 
shown to be less effective in family-owned corporations (Palmberg, 2012).  
3.2 External Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The legal system is one of the most important and effective systems for governance as it 
regulates firm behaviour and ensures investor protection (Babatunde & Olaniran, 2009). 
Needless to state, the quality of the rules and enforcement differs across the world. In 
countries with weak judicial systems, governance tends to be even more important. Another 
type of external mechanism that can influence firms are the gatekeepers, i.e. media, analysts 
etc. Coffee (2005) suggests that different gatekeepers have more importance in different 
economies and legal regimes. Generally, the gatekeeper serves a better function in a 
dispersed regime, where there are fewer block-holders that monitor management, even 
though that can trigger another type of expropriation, as stated above. For example, auditor 
independence is affected in a concentrated ownership structure as the auditor reports to the 
management that consist of the large owner. The auditor can have difficulties to escape the 
control of the group it is expected to monitor (Coffee, 2005).  
3.3 Performance of Corporate Governance  
The success of the governance mechanisms have empirically been tested in performance-
based studies; where a vast amount of research has documented that mechanisms can 
positively contribute to firm performance and value (Ramly & Rashid, 2010; Soh, 2011; Zhu, 
2009). As for board independence, one of the most investigated variables, Lama (2012) and 
Palmberg (2012) report that the majority of research fails to find a significant association 
with firm performance. Moreover, Amir et al (2010) states that the quality of information is 
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inversely related to the cost of capital. Due to the fact that auditors influence the reported 
information, auditor independence and financial reporting is said to be positively related. 
Furthermore, the quality and quantity of the information flowing from the corporation 
increases transparency and decreases the information asymmetry between the firm and the 
market. These factors decrease the overall risk profile of the firm. Creditors and investors will 
therefore demand a lower risk premium on their required return on equity and debt, 
respectively (Bozec & Bozec, 2010). In essence, governance serves as investor, or financier, 
protection.  
3.4 Governance Influence on the Cost of Capital 
As Soh (2011) reports, it is a widely accepted statement that a high level of corporate 
governance has a positive impact on a firms cost of capital, e.g. decreasing them. Taking a 
performance-based approach, Bozec & Bozec (2010) study the Canadian market during the 
years of 2002 and 2005, and tests governance levels with the corresponding weighted average 
cost of capital and finds a strong relationship between the variables. Measuring governance 
through a ROB- (Report on business) index, it suggests that better devotion to governance is 
associated with decreased WACC for Canadian firms. The ROB-index incorporates a wide 
set of governance variables that are identified as being critical to the effectiveness of 
governance. The index comprises board composition, an assessment of board independence, 
as well as the three committees; nomination, remuneration and audit. Furthermore, the index 
scores compensation, shareholder rights and information disclosure. In line with these results, 
Pham et al (2012) report in their study on the Australian market for the years 1994 and 2003 
that greater insider ownership, higher presence of institutional block-holders and small 
independent boards serve to lower the overall cost of capital.  
Other studies concentrate on the cost of equity and cost of debt respectively. Shah & Butt 
(2009) find a negative relationship between cost of equity and board size, studying the 
Pakistani market. The interpretation is that a board with many members decreases the risk 
that one can dominate the decisions. Equivalently, managerial ownership is found to have a 
negative impact on the cost of equity. As such, a board consisting of members with 
ownership will likely have a higher cost of equity compared to a board with lower managerial 
ownership. Unexpectedly, audit committee- and board independence are found to have an 
insignificant effect. The explanation offered is the Pakistani law system, as it does not 
distinguish between independent- and dependent directors. Ashbaugh et al (2004), whom test 
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the quality of firm financial disclosure quality, ownership structure, stakeholder rights, as 
well as board structure in relation to cost of equity, find significant results. In a US setting, 
the governance variables are turned into a composite index and the measure utilized as cost of 
equity capital is two-fold; the average firms expected return and the price-earnings growth 
ratio.   
In an emerging market setting, Chen et al (2004) investigate how disclosure and corporate 
governance affect cost of equity capital of nine Asian countries for the years 2000 and 2001, 
and find a significant negative relationship between the variables. The cost of equity capital 
estimate is derived from the residual income valuation model and the governance variables 
are taken from a Credit Lyonnais study. The authors state that country-level investor 
protection also has a predictive ability of the cost of equity. The same result is also the 
finding in Guangming et al (2011), whom study the Chinese market and establish governance 
indices with a focus on information disclosure. They conclude that the cost of equity 
decreases with transparent and high quality disclosures. Zhu (2009) suggests a substitution 
effect for governance impact on the cost of debt when it comes to countries with weak legal 
systems, as the author finds that firm-level governance practices could substitute for country-
level protection. As for the cost of equity, a complementary effect is attained, as the cost of 
equity is the lowest for firms in countries with better legal systems. Overall, the findings are 
coherent with previous studies that cost of debt and equity are lower for firms with good 
governance for the 22 countries studied.  
Turning to research into governance impact on the cost of debt, Blom & Schauten (2006) test 
the premise that higher quality of governance practice should imply lower cost of debt, as 
debt holders should take governance activities into account when assessing the default risk. 
The authors use the Deminor Rating for the years 2000 and 2004 as a proxy for governance 
variables. The rating consists of four main categories; shareholder rights, range of takeover 
defences, disclosures and board structure. The stated premise is found to be true, namely that 
firms with upright governance also have a lower cost of debt. Studying the French market, 
Piot & Piera (2007) investigate whether governance and audit quality has an impact on the 
cost of debt. The explanation offered is that debt-holders risk originates in agency 
expropriation risk and information risk. The first concerns the risk that managers tries to 
transfer wealth on the expense of creditors, and the latter relates to the quality of financial 
reporting. The study find that the three governance traits; board involvement in monitoring of 
governance issues, the monitoring power of institutional investors, board independence, all 
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have a significant reducing effect on the cost of borrowing. Klock et al (2005) investigate 
governance and the cost of debt, where governance is proxied by anti-takeover provisions and 
debt is calculated as the yield spread. The results indicate that substantial anti-takeover 
provisions and weak shareholder protections are related to a lower cost of debt.  
Bozec & Bozec (2010) summarize former studies on the relationship between governance and 
cost of capital, which suggests that research in a North American setting generally has 
yielded inconclusive results. Studies performed in an European- and emerging country 
context is much more conclusive toward the fact that governance significantly influence cost 
of capital. Moreover, the dissimilarities in results is said to be due to the differences in legal 
systems and weak investor protection. In a country with weak systems and protection, the 
governance code is said to be much more forceful and significant. In addition, the comply-or-
explain approach that is in use in some economies is suggested to yield more inter-firm 
variations and therefore a stronger result. 
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4 Methodology  
This chapter describes the tests and data for the purpose of this thesis. Later chapters will 
include previous research in this field and describe the models applied. 
 
The thesis uses a quantitative- and deductive research approach, as the aim is to explore the 
level of explanatory power of certain corporate governance variables on the firms cost of 
capital (Saunders, 2009). Hypotheses are formed according to findings of previously 
performed studies in the field of corporate governance and the Swedish corporate governance 
framework.  
4.1 Data collection and Time-Horizon 
The data included in the study consists of Swedish small-, mid- and large-cap listed 
companies that all are subject to the Swedish corporate governance framework. Thus, the 
number of companies included in the study is 242 with a fall-out of 13. The fall-out is due to 
lacking information published. For example, some of the companies did not publish corporate 
governance information prior to 2010. Other firms included were first listed on the market 
later on during the period. There are 59 large-cap listed companies included, as well as 183 
SMEs. The study covers the period of 2008 until 2013, since the latest corporate governance 
framework was published in 2008. The overall number of observations becomes 1,190. The 
data is manually gathered from annual- and corporate governance reports, where compliance 
and non-compliance is, or at least should be, explicitly stated. Moreover, information 
regarding control- and dependent variables are collected through the databases CapitalIQ and 
Datastream.  
4.2 Dependent Variable 
The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) incorporates the firms cost of equity, cost of 
debt, the tax rate and its capital structure, the amount of debt and equity on the balance sheet 
(Miles & Ezzell, 1980). The equation can be written as; 
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Where R is the notation for the cost of equity capital and R is the cost of debt capital.  
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4.2.1 Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital 
Estimation of the cost of equity capital, or the investors required rate of return, can be 
performed in different ways. Three popular methods include the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Treynor, 1962 & Lintner, 1965), Fama & French (1993) Three 
Factor Model and the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) (Soh, 2011). However, there are 
issues regarding the models that can lead to inaccurate results. Firstly, the use of historical 
data to project the market risk premium in the CAPM, leads to high standard errors. The 
second limitation is regarding the varying risk factor loadings through time and across 
industries. The models call for a constant loading in order to be accurate. The last problem is 
choosing the right model, as the different models present different results 
(Fama & French, 2007). Although it is still ambiguous which method is the most appropriate 
to utilize (Soh, 2011), the primary approach used in previous research is the CAPM 
(e.g. Bozec & Bozec, 2010). The CAPM can be written as follows; 
 = R! + β(R# − R!)                   ( 2 ) 
Where R! is the risk free rate, β is the notation for beta, the sensitivity of the firm to the 
market as a whole, and R#  is the market return.(R# − R!)  is the market risk premium 
discussed above. Due to the difficulty of estimating a precise risk premium, the authors 
implement the findings of Sörenson (2011), where it is suggested that a reasonable equity risk 
premium for the Swedish market is around 4.5 %. This premium level is also supported in 
Jäckel & Muhlhäuser (2011), whom report an equity premium of 4.93% for Sweden.  As for 
an appropriate risk free rate, the 10-year government bond is used, which is proposed in 
Sörensson (2011). The beta coefficient is gathered manually based on the returns of the stock 
price and calculated in the following way: 
$ %& =
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4.2.2 Estimating the Cost of Debt Capital 
The most common measure for the cost of debt in prior research is the yield spread, which is 
the average debt yield to maturity in excess of the risk free rate (see for example, Bradley & 
Chen, 2011; Blom & Shauten, 2008; Soh, 2011). Since this measure only can be computed 
using publicly traded debt, and the majority of the companies included in this study do not 
have that, this study defines the cost of debt as the interest payments divided by the total 
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outstanding debt, yielding a percentage. Such a methodology is employed in Zhu (2009) and 
Francis et al (2005).   
4.3 Independent Variables  
Similarly to measures of corporate governance included in previous studies (Bozec & Bozec, 
2011; Pham et al, 2012; Blom & Schauten, 2008; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Ashbaugh et al, 
2004), the included variables in this study are measures of board composition (section 4), 
audit committee- (section 7), nomination committee- (section 2) and remuneration committee 
(section 9) composition and independence. That is, the majority of the variables tested are 
internal governance mechanisms that are found to be explicitly stated in the Swedish 
corporate governance code. The methodology to arrive at a compliance or non-compliance 
for each of the variables, are to manually browse the firm’s annual reports for each of the 
years included in the study, looking for explicitly stated deviations of the code. Similarly to 
Zhu (2009) and Li (2010), a binary value of 1 is assigned if the firm does not comply with the 
code and zero otherwise, for each of the categories. Moreover, as the binary value of 1 
indicates non-compliance, this study will interpret a positive coefficient as a decrease in the 
cost of capital. Due to data issues, explained in the following section, the independent 
variables are subject to slight transformation applied as instrumental variables.  
4.4 Data Issues 
There is an apparent risk that corporate governance studies include less desirable properties 
that may bias how the independent variable affects the dependent variable if it is ignored 
(Wintoki et al, 2009). Bozec & Bozec (2010) discuss an omitted variable problem that could 
arise if an unobservable variable affects both the dependent- and independent variables. 
Endogeneity could also involve reverse causality, meaning that the casual effect of how the 
dependent- and independent variables affect each other cannot be determined. Previous 
studies use instrumental variables, as well as utilizing a two-stage least-square (2SLS) 
framework, to mitigate the problems (Bozec & Bozec, 2011; Pham et al, 2012; Blom & 
Schauten, 2008; Bradley & Chen, 2011; Ashbaugh et al, 2004). This study addresses the risk 
of endogeneity by incorporating instrumental variables to proxy for the governance 
mechanisms, as well as running the regressions with fixed-effects, two-stage framework. In 
addition, according to Zheka (2006), the use of control variables reduces the problem of 
finding the optimal differences. The Hausman (1978) test established that a fixed-effects set 
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up was more appropriate than a random effects, by rejecting the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients (Brooks, 2008).  
4.5 Instrumental variables 
The objective of instrumental variables is to find variables that are correlated with the 
explanatory, endogenous variables, but uncorrelated with the dependent variables, which is a 
difficult process (Zheka, 2006). Table 2 below shows an overview of the instruments used in 
this thesis. Due to the difficulty, the decision is made to use indices for those variables. While 
the corporate governance variables used are binary, i.e. either 0 or 1, the index measures the 
percentage of non-compliance in a certain section of the code or the code as an entity. In 
order to test the instruments, the J-test, also known as the Sargan test, is incorporated after 
running the 2SLS regression, which tests for over-identification (Hansen, 1982). The null 
hypothesis is that J = 0, which is that the over-identification is valid, i.e. the instruments are 
correlated with the error term. Rejecting the J-test therefore shows that the instruments are 
identified and valid. 
 
Table 2: Description of the instruments applied 
As certain indices, or sums/products of indices, are also explaining the dependent variable, 
different indices are constructed for different regressions in order to overcome the 
endogeneity issue. Nevertheless, the corporate governance index constructed is always part of 
the set of instrumental variables. As described in Table 2, it is calculated as the average 
percentage of non-compliance among the four tested sections of the code. The average non-
compliance (‘Avg. non.-com.’) is the average of the binary non-compliance of each section of 
the code and is calculated in a similar way as the corporate governance index. The indices 
(‘Index’) are defined as the percentage of non-compliance in each of the tested sections of the 
Instruments Explanation
CGI
Corporate governance index, calculated as the average of the 
percentage of non-compliance of all four tested corporate 
governance sections.
Avg. non.-com.
Average non-compliance, calculated as the average of non-
compliance of the binary non-compliance all four test corporate 
governance sections.
Index 'number' Percentage of non-compliance for a specific part of the code.
Index 'number' + Index 'number' Percentage of non-compliance of two specific parts of the code.
Index 'number' * Index 'number' Product of two/three indices of specific parts of the corporate governance code.
 28 Schmidt, Swärdh (2014): Corporate Governance in Sweden – A Success Story?  
code. Table 3 shows the instruments applied for the regressions in the 2SLS setup. The 
corporate governance index is part in every regression while the other four instruments are 
changing, which is caused by the arising problem of explaining the dependent variable. This 
is due to the fact that those might explain the dependent variable and can therefore not be 
applied in the regression.  
Appendix B shows the correlation matrices for the explained variable, the corporate 
governance variables and the instrumental variables. Zheka (2006) used instrumental 
variables, even though they might be correlated with the dependent variable. This 
instrumental variable should, nevertheless, not be explained by the dependent variable in the 
reduced form regression. 
Table 18 through Table 26 show the reduced form regressions with instrumental variables 
substituting for dependent variables and the previously dependent variables are being part of 
the independent variables. It is shown that WACC, cost of equity and cost of debt is not 
explanatory in any of the regression, while the corporate governance variables are significant 
to explain the instrumental variables.  
 
Table 3: Overview of the instruments applied for each regression 
 
  
Instrument 1 Instrument 2 Instrument 3 Instrument 4 Instrument 5
WACC
Overall CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 4 + Index 7 Index 4 + Index 9
SME CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 4 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 2 + Index 7 Index 2 + Index 9
Large-Cap CGI Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 9 Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 4 + Index 7 Index 4 + Index 9
Cost of Equity
Overall CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 2 + Index 7 Index 2 + Index 9
SME CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 2 + Index 7 Index 2 + Index 9
Large-Cap CGI Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 9 Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 4 + Index 7 Index 7 + Index 9
Cost of Debt
Overall CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 4 + Index 7 Index 4 + Index 9
SME CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 2 + Index 9 Index 4 + Index 9
Large-Cap CGI Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 7 Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 4 + Index 9 Index 7 + Index 9
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4.6 Control Variables  
Control variables that are known to have predictive power over a firms cost of capital are 
included in the regressions in order to control for their predictive effects.  
Also included in, for example Ashbaugh et al, (2004), Zhu, (2009), Bozec & Bozec, (2010) 
and Chen et al, (2004), a size factor is defined as the log of total assets. The expectation is 
that size is negatively correlated to the cost of capital, due to the fact that larger firms are 
expected to be more diversified (Bozec & Bozec, 2010), more transparent, as well as having 
reduced bankruptcy risk (Byun, 2007). This should have a lowering effect of the overall risk 
profile.  
Furthermore, beta is included to control for the systematic risk (Ashbaugh et al, 2010; 
Byun, 2007), and volatility to control for the idiosyncratic, firm-specific risk (Zhu, 2009; 
Pham et al, 2012). The anticipation for these variables is to have a positive effect on the cost 
of capital, as a riskier firm should have a higher capital cost, for both the debt- and equity 
portion.  
A leverage variable (Zhu, 2009; Bozec & Bozec, 2010; Pham et al, 2012), defined as total 
debt over equity, is included for two reasons. Firstly, firms with higher leverage are likely to 
have higher cost of debt than other firms. Secondly, that fact will also imply a higher 
bankruptcy risk, meaning that equity-holders should require a higher rate of return on their 
capital. Hence, leverage is expected to have an increasing effect on the cost of capital.  
Another variable included is ownership (Zhu, 2009), which is defined as the three largest 
shareholders of a company. Being the norm in many countries outside of the US, large 
shareholders hold a monitoring role of management and can possibly mitigate this form of 
agency issue.  
Finally, market-to-book is a control variable commonly included in equivalent studies (Pham 
et al, 2012; Bozec & Bozec, 2010; Ashbaugh et al, 2010; Zhu 2009). The M/B is to proxy for 
growth prospects. As stated in Bozec & Bozec, (2010), the relationship between M/B and the 
cost of capital is difficult to predict beforehand. High growth companies are partly anticipated 
to be riskier, increasing the cost of capital. On the other hand, they are expected to yield 
higher returns in the future, which is a decreasing effect on the capital cost. Empirically, the 
relationship is found to be decreasing (Hail & Leuz, 2006).   
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4.7 Regressions  
In order to test the stated hypotheses, different panel data regressions are run. Each of the 
regressions is run with Panel Least Squares, as well as 2SLS. All tests are run with robust 
standard errors to capture possible heteroskedasticity problems that could occur in the 
regression. Firstly, a Hausman test is applied to test whether a fixed- or random-effects model 
should be applied. If the test statistic is rejected, the fixed-effects model fits the data better 
than the random effects model and is therefore to be preferred. The first regressions are panel 
least squares regression with robust standard errors on the dependent variables WACC, cost 
of equity and cost of debt. The independent variables in this case are the different sections of 
the Swedish code of corporate governance and the control variables discussed in 4.6, namely: 
- Beta 
- Debt-to-Equity ratio 
- Market-to-Book ratio 
- The shareholdings of the three largest shareholders 
- Size, calculated as the logarithm of total assets 
- 12-month volatility of the stock price 
The base regressions are stated in the following way: 
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where 
WACC = Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
COE = Cost of Equity 
COD = Cost of Debt 
CG2 = Compliance with section 2 of the Swedish code of Corporate Governance 
(Nomination Committee) 
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CG4 = Compliance with section 4 of the Swedish code of Corporate Governance (Board 
Composition) 
CG7 = Compliance with section 7 of the Swedish code of Corporate Governance (Audit 
Committee) 
CG9 = Compliance with section 9 of the Swedish code of Corporate Governance 
(Remuneration Committee) 
BETA = One-year beta of the share price of the company 
DE = Debt-to-equity ratio of the company 
MB = Market-to-book ratio of the company 
SH = Sum of the ownership of the largest three shareholders of the company 
SIZE = Logarithm of the total assets of the company 
VOLA = One-year volatility of the share price of the company 
The second and main regression is the two-stage least squares regression with instrumental 
variables introduced. The instrumental variables applied needs to be correlated with the 
corporate governance variables, but unrelated with the output, i.e. WACC, cost of equity and 
cost of debt. The correlation matrix provides a first indication into the validity of the 
instruments. Nevertheless, a reduced form regression is run to observe whether the instrument 
is explained by the corporate governance variables and the independent variables (cmpr. 
Zheka, 2006). The reduced form equations are stated below. Note that equation 7 is for 
instrumental variables for WACC, equation 8 for cost of equity and equation 9 for the cost of 
debt. 
QR,% = α + β2CG2	,
 + β6CG4	,
 + β8CG7	,
 + β:CG9	,
 + β<BETA	,
 + βODE	,
 + β@MB	,
 
                     +βFSIZE	,
 + β2IVOLA	,
 + β22WACC	,
                           ( 7 ) 
QRMN,% = α + β2CG2	,
 + β6CG4	,
 + β8CG7	,
 + β:CG9	,
 + βODE	,
 + β@MB	,
 + βCSH	,
 
                  +βFSIZE	,
 + β2IVOLA	,
 + β22WACC	,
                       ( 8 ) 
QRMP,% = α + β2CG2	,
 + β6CG4	,
 + β8CG7	,
 + β:CG9	,
 + β<BETA	,
 + βODE	,
 + β@MB	,
 
                  +βCSH	,
 + βFSIZE	,
 + β2IVOLA	,
 + β22WACC	,
              ( 9 ) 
Similar to the panel least squares regression, adjustments for cross-sectional fixed effects are 
made, as well as White’s robust standard errors are applied. Further, a J-test is applied to 
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measure the effectiveness of the introduced instruments. If the J-test is rejected, the 
instruments are sufficient and it gives more confidence regarding the model. 
4.8 Data Reliability 
In terms of reliability, it is important to point out that the data included in the thesis could be 
subject to database- and human error. The authors cannot guarantee the legitimacy of the data 
gathered from the databases Datastream and/or CapitalIQ. Also, as a large quantity of the 
data regarding the governance codes are collected manually, there is a risk of 
misinterpretation or an equivalent error. In addition to this, as discussed earlier, there is a risk 
of econometric issues, such as endogeneity etc.  
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5 Hypotheses Development 
This chapter describes the development of four different hypotheses regarding complying 
with corporate governance codes that will be tested in chapter 6.  
5.1 H0: Compliance with Corporate Governance Leads to a Lower Cost of 
Capital 
The corporate governance framework in Sweden states that the aim of the code is to increase 
the overall confidence, as well as the supply of risk capital (CG code, 2010). Theoretically, 
the interpretation is that non-compliance should result in lower confidence and less supply of 
risk capital, portrayed as a higher cost of capital. As stated in the previous section, the 
majority of studies into the relationship between adherence to governance and the cost of 
capital have yielded a significant outcome. In fact, studies in a European setting are almost 
exhaustively found to have a significant impact. North American studies are, however, a bit 
more ambiguous. The Swedish context offers the comply-or-explain approach that Bozec & 
Bozec (2010) used to explain the strong significant relationship between governance and cost 
of capital in an emerging market setting. The argument was that this creates larger inter-firm 
variations. However, the Swedish judicial system is very strong, meaning that the governance 
system does not have to bridge a gap in the same extent as in countries with weak investor 
protection and a weak overall legal system. In general, the difference between a fully-
compliant firm and non-compliant firm in Sweden is not as large as it would be for the 
equivalent firm in an emerging country, using an argument in line with Bozec & Bozec (2010) 
and Zhu (2009). The risk-spread is therefore lower for the Swedish market. Nonetheless, in 
line with conclusions of previous studies, combined with the statements in the corporate 
governance framework, the expectation is to find a significant relationship between the 
governance variables and the overall cost of capital, as it should lower the risk profile of the 
firm.  
5.2 H0: Compliance with Corporate Governance Leads to a Lower cost of 
Equity 
Governance seeks to mitigate agency costs by lowering the possibilities for such behavior. By 
creating independent boards and committees that have a diminishing effect on individual 
expropriation, the cost of equity should be lower for firms with more independent committees 
and boards, i.e. governance. This is also the general finding of studies, e.g., Shah & Butt 
(2009), Ashbaugh et al (2004) and Chen et al (2004). 
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5.3 H0: Compliance with Corporate Governance Leads to a Lower Cost of Debt 
The same argument, as stated above, can be extended to the cost of debt. The risk that should 
be compensated through a risk premium is lowered by governance activities. Also, previous 
studies establishes a significant negative relationship, e.g. Blom & Schauten (2006), Piot & 
Piera (2007) and Klock et al (2005), However, debt-holders have another method at their 
disposal, they can impose covenants to restrict management. Factors that are perceived to be 
too risky can be adjusted in a contract. Therefore, creditors could perhaps not depend as 
heavily on regulations and enforcement to protect their interest. The general expectation is 
still that governance activities should have a lowering effect on the cost of debt.  
5.4 H0: The relative Gain of Governance is Higher for SMEs than Large-Cap 
Listed Companies  
As SME’s face the same exhortations as larger corporations, but are significantly smaller in 
terms of revenue, market capitalization etc., the relative cost of compliance per every SEK 
revenue are higher for these companies. Simply put, the relative effort to comply could be 
viewed as greater for SME’s rather than larger firms (Nedelchev, 2013). In addition to this, as 
SMEs are less transparent compared to larger companies, the expectation is to find a stronger 
negative significance between governance and the cost of capital for SMEs compared to 
larger-cap listed corporations.  
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6 Estimation Results and Analysis 
This chapter starts with the descriptive statistics of this thesis. Furthermore, it shows the 
results of the regressions and analyses the outcomes. It further gives explanations regarding 
those results. A summary of the significant results can be observed in Table 6.3 The structure 
of this chapter is following the order used in chapter 5. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The following table states the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the tests. As 
previously discussed, the overall observations are 1,190, which is divided in observations 
from 59 large-cap companies and 183 SMEs. For details, see Table 4 below: 
 
Table 4: Describing statistics for output, input and control variables  
6.2 Results and Analysis of the Hypotheses 
The overall results of the study can be found in the appendix from page 50 onwards. Further, 
the results of the J-test for over-identification can be found in Table 8. Table 6 shows a 
summary of the results and its statistical significance. Before running the regressions, tests 
for fixed- and random effects need to be applied. The Hausman test for correlated random 
effects is performed to test whether a fixed- or a random effects model is to be applied. As 
Table 5 shows the test-statistic is not rejected, which results in the fact that the fixed effects 
                                                 
3
 Statistically significant results in this chapter are shown in the following way: 
*** significant on a 1% level 
** significant on a 5% level 
* significant on a 10% level 
Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Output variable
WACC 1,190 5.3% 1.6% 1.0% 15.4%
Cost of Equity 1,190 3.0% 1.6% 0.0% 9.5%
Cost of Debt 989 5.3% 1.6% 1.0% 15.4%
Input variables
2. Nomination Committee 1,190 0.29 0.46 0 1
4. Board Composition 1,190 0.05 0.22 0 1
7. Audit Committee 1,190 0.23 0.42 0 1
9. Remuneration Committee 1,190 0.12 0.32 0 1
Control variables
Beta 1,190 0.66 0.36 0.00 2.11
Debt/Equity ratio 1,017 1.05 4.05 -20.11 78.89
Market-to-Book ratio 1,185 2.63 9.65 -86.41 285.75
Shareholder 1,190 0.51 1.08 0.06 37.06
Log (Total Assets) 1,178 7.89 8.68 4.42 9.81
Volatility 1,190 0.42 0.18 0.11 1.67
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model should be applied for all regressions regarding WACC and cost of equity, but a 
random effects model should be used for the cost of debt.  
 
 
Table 5: Hausman test for all companies on the defined independent variables 
Furthermore, a correlation matrix is obtained to show the cross-correlations between the 
instrumental variable, the control variables and the specific independent variable (s. Table 9 
through Table 17). To further test the instruments, a reduced regression is run (s. equations 4 
through 6), which can be observed on the Table 18 through Table 26. 
 
Table 6: Summary of the results; for details s. Table 27 – Table 32 
Regression Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
WACC
Overall 32.2014 10 0.0004
SME 27.1003 10 0.0025
Large-Cap 27.0033 10 0.0026
Cost of Equity
Overall 43.6665 9 0.0000
SME 26.4427 9 0.0017
Large-Cap 77.7011 9 0.0000
Cost of Debt
Overall 12.7697 10 0.2368
SME 15.2974 10 0.1216
Large-Cap 84.0574 10 0.5893
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO Beta D/E M/B Shareholder Size Volatility
WACC
Overall Yes* Yes* Yes*** Yes** Yes*** Yes**
SME Yes** Yes*** Yes** Yes*** Yes**
Large-Cap Yes*** Yes* Yes***
Cost of Equity
Overall Yes* Yes** n.a. Yes* Yes*** Yes* Yes***
SME Yes*** n.a. Yes** Yes** Yes*** Yes***
Large-Cap Yes*** n.a. Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes** Yes***
Cost of Debt
Overall Yes*
SME Yes**
Large-Cap
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO Beta D/E M/B Shareholder Size Volatility
WACC
Overall Yes** Yes** Yes*** Yes** Yes** Yes**
SME Yes* Yes*** Yes** Yes*** Yes**
Large-Cap Yes*** Yes* Yes***
Cost of Equity
Overall Yes** Yes*** n.a. Yes* Yes*** Yes* Yes***
SME Yes* Yes*** n.a. Yes** Yes** Yes*** Yes***
Large-Cap Yes* n.a. Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes** Yes***
Cost of Debt
Overall Yes*** Yes** Yes*** Yes*
SME Yes*** Yes* Yes*** Yes*
Large-Cap
Panel Least Squares
CG variables
CG variables
Control variables
Control variables
Two-Stage Least-Squares
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6.2.1 Compliance with Corporate Governance Leads to a Lower Cost of Capital 
The first hypothesis to be tested is that corporate governance, or certain parts of the code, has 
a significant impact on the cost of capital of a firm. Using a basic OLS-regression, utilizing 
cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors, gives a first indication on the result. It 
can be shown that the nomination committee (CG section 2) and the board composition 
(CG section 4) have a significant impact on the cost of capital on a 10% level 
(p-value = 0.0549* and p-value = 0.0681*). The audit committee and the remuneration 
committee (section 7 and 9) do not have a significant impact on the cost of capital. Also, the 
coefficients are positive, showing that non-violations of those two sections lead to a lower 
cost of capital. For a summary, see Table 27. Consequently, the other way around is also true. 
The control variables included yield different results, as beta, leverage, market-to-book and 
volatility exhibit significant impact. All variables except leverage have a positive effect, 
which is expected as increasing leverage should have an increasing effect on the cost of 
capital. Size and ownership structure are insignificant in the tests.  
Using 2SLS with instrumental variables presents results that confirm the outcomes from the 
OLS regression. The instrumental variables applied are defined in Table 7 and the correlation 
matrix of the instruments, the control variables and the dependent variable are shown in 
Table 9. The nomination committee, as well as the board composition, have significant 
impact on cost of capital on a 5% level (p-value = 0.0105** and p-value = 0.0369**). As in 
the OLS, the coefficients are positive, showing that applying those two codes has a negative 
effect on the cost of capital. Further, compliance with the codes for the audit committee and 
the remuneration committee does not have a significant impact on cost of capital (s. Table 30). 
As for the control variables, the results are the same as in the tests for panel least squares.  
The following hypothesis can therefore not be rejected: 
H0: Compliance with corporate governance leads to a lower cost of capital  
The regression results points to the overall fact that the nomination committee- and board 
composition are the variables of interest when viewing the effects on the weighted average of 
the cost of capital. This is a bit contradictory to what Lama (2012) and Palmberg (2012) state, 
namely that the majority of studies fail to find a significant relationship between firm 
performance and board composition. Furthermore, it can be stated that these factors are most 
successful in decreasing the risk profile of the firm. As Swedish companies often have large, 
controlling owners, it is not surprising that the governance variables do not have as 
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significant of an overall impact as in for example Bozec & Bozec (2010 and 
Pham et al (2012). Palmberg (2012) indicated that governance mechanisms have less effect 
in such in a concentrated ownership context. This could be due to the fact that these majority 
owners have substantial control and insight into the corporation, and therefore do not value 
the governance variables as high as in a market with dispersed ownership. Also, the Swedish 
legal system offers considerable protection by default, leaving less of a judicial gap for 
governance to close. It could be claimed, however, that such an argument is hard to make 
comparing with for example North American studies, as those markets also have good legal 
regulation. Instead, it could be more applicable to markets with weaker legal systems, e.g. 
emerging markets. Also, the structure, or the overall rules of the code, could play a 
substantial role. The comply-or-explain method leaves the decision-making up to the 
company. This means that non-compliance of the code actually could be the most appropriate 
direction for the company in question. From a stewardship theory perspective, the market 
could trust and be content with the managerial abilities to utilize the resources in the most 
effective way. Perhaps concentrating on other ventures is viewed by the market as more risk-
lowering than focusing on governance activities.  
Nevertheless, it is still a bit surprising that audit committee existence and independence do 
not yield significant results. As disclosed in Coffee (2005), ensuring audit committee 
independence can be even harder in a market with concentrated ownership, as the majority 
owner have the ability to influence the independence in a larger extent than in a market with a 
dispersed ownership structure. Therefore, if a company manages to overcome this obstacle, 
the result should be apparent. Also, as Amir et al (2010) claim, the audit independence tends 
to influence the quality of information produced and communicated, positively. Therefore, an 
independent audit function should correspond to a lower cost of capital.  
6.2.2 Compliance with Corporate Governance Leads to a Lower Cost of Equity 
The second hypothesis is that corporate governance has a significant lowering effect on the 
cost of equity of a firm. In this case, beta is not applied as one of the control variables, as this 
is correlated to the cost of equity when applying CAPM. Again, a basic OLS-regression using 
cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors are applied. Interestingly, significant 
results can be obtained for the sections 2 and 9 (p-value = 0.0700* and p-value = 0.0000***), 
which is different from the observations for the overall cost of capital in the previous section. 
For the sections 4 and 7 of the Swedish corporate governance code, no significant results 
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could be obtained (p-value = 0.6258 and p-value = 0.1787). The coefficients and the 
significance can be observed in Table 28. Of the control variables, only market-to-book is 
insignificant. The others are significant on 10- and 5% levels, with only leverage having an 
increasing effect on the cost of equity.  
In a 2SLS setting, applying instrumental variables, using cross-sectional fixed effects and 
robust standard errors, the results are even more significant for section 2 of the corporate 
governance code (p-value = 0.0258**), which is significant on a 5% level, while section 9 
remains at a p-value of 0.0000***. Furthermore, the sections 4 and 7 of the code have shown 
no impact on the cost of equity and could therefore be less important when trying to lower the 
cost of capital (s. Table 31). The control variables show similar results as for the panel least 
squares.  
The following hypothesis can therefore also not be rejected:  
H0: Compliance with the corporate governance code leads to lower cost of equity  
The interpretation of the finding is that equity holders value nomination- and remuneration 
committee independence the highest, and has a lower required return on their equity as these 
committees exist and exhibit independence. The fact that the results indicated some 
significant relationship between governance and the cost of equity is in line with 
Ashbaugh (2004), Chen et al (2004), Guangming et al (2011) and Zhu (2009). Coherent with 
the findings of Shah & Butt (2009), audit committee- and board composition does not play a 
substantial role in setting the return requirement for owners. Perhaps there is not a concern of 
agency problems arising attributable to the composition of these functions. It could be that 
the average beliefs are in line with stewardship theory and contradictory to agency theory that 
the board does not try to expropriate from the shareholders.  
6.2.3 Compliance with Corporate Governance Leads to a Lower Cost of Debt  
As stated in chapter 5.3, the premonition is that compliance with corporate governance has a 
significant lowering effect on the cost of debt. Applying OLS-regression on the cost of debt 
using cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors, shows, once again, a first 
indication of which variables might drive the cost of debt (s. Table 29). It is shown that none 
of the corporate governance codes are significant. Further, only the debt-to-equity ratio is 
significant (p-value = 0.0605*), even though only on a 10% level. 
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In a 2SLS setup with instrumental variables, the regression yields the same result and no 
variables but debt/equity is significant (p-value = 0.0608*). This is coherent with the 
hypothesis that debt holders can control certain risks in contract covenants. Therefore, they 
do not rely as much on regulation and enforcement as owners. The results can be obtained in. 
Further, the J-test for over-identifying variables (J-test = 0.3159) is rejected, which gives 
more confidence in the instrumental variables applied. In contrast to the finding of the least 
squares estimation, all control variables except beta and ownership structure are significant. 
Size and leverage have an increasing effect on the cost of debt.  
This leads to the rejection of the following hypothesis: 
H0: Compliance with corporate governance leads to lower cost of debt  
In contrast to the findings of Blom & Schauten (2006), Piot & Piera (2007) and 
Klock et al (2005), none of the governance variables yielded explanatory power of the cost of 
debt. A possible explanation could be that debt holders can restrict the risk through covenants. 
They can individually specify the conditions given and thereby control the possible agency 
problems instead of relying on governance to safeguard from expropriation. Surprisingly, size 
leads to a higher cost of debt, which is quite counterintuitive.  
6.2.4 The Relative Gain of Governance is Higher for SMEs than Large-Cap Listed 
Companies 
The final hypothesis to be tested is whether the relative gain for complying with corporate 
governance is higher for SMEs than for companies that are defined as large-cap companies. It 
is further tested if the effect differs for WACC, cost of equity and cost of debt. The results are 
summarized in Table 27 through Table 32. Firstly, a base regression for both sets of 
companies is run on WACC. It is shown, for SMEs, that the section 4 of the corporate 
governance code is significant (p-value = 0.0480**) with a positive coefficient. Thus, this 
section has a lowering effect on the cost of capital. For the large-cap companies, no 
significance for any parts of corporate governance can be observed.  
In a 2SLS setup, the results for SMEs appear to be even less significant, as the section 2 are 
significant only on 10% level (p-value = 0.0912). On the flip side, no significance can be 
observed for large-cap firms in any of the sections. The J-statistics are both rejected 
(= 0.8647 and = 0.5327), which shows that the applied instruments are proper. It can 
therefore be summarized that complying with corporate governance has a more significant 
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impact on the cost of capital for SMEs than for large-cap firms, even though it is a slim 
margin.  
In a next step, the difference between SMEs and large-cap firms is tested regarding the cost 
of equity. Once again, the beta is taken out of the control variables in order to overcome the 
multicollinearity problem that arises when applying CAPM. The basic panel lest squares 
regression shows that only section 9 of the corporate governance code has as a significant 
impact on the cost of equity for SMEs (p-value = 0.0006***). For the blue chip companies, 
only section 4 is slightly significant (p-value = 0.0831*) on a 10% level. Applying 2SLS with 
instrumental variables shows that also section 2 of the corporate governance code has an 
impact on the cost of equity for SMEs (p-value = 0.0784*). Moreover, as with the panel least 
squares estimation, section 9 is also significant (p-value = 0.0003***). For the large-cap 
companies, only section 4 is slightly significant (p-value = 0.0831*), while complying with 
other parts of the code does not lead to a significant improvement in the cost of equity. Again, 
the instruments applied for the regression are proper with J-statistics of 0.4974 for SMEs and 
0.4143 for large-cap companies. It can therefore be summarized that complying with the code 
of corporate governance is more beneficial for SMEs than for large-cap companies with 
regards to the cost of equity. Nevertheless, the margin is relatively slim.   
Lastly, the difference between SMEs and large-cap companies is tested regarding its effect on 
the cost of debt. Once again, a basic panel least squares regression is run, which shows for 
both, SMEs and large-cap companies no significant impact of any corporate governance 
variables. Using 2SLS including instrumental variables complies with that result and the fact 
that good corporate governance does not lead to any impact on the cost of debt, regardless of 
the size of the company. Also, the regression passes the J-test (= 0.1932 for SMEs and = 
0.6237 for large-cap), which gives confidence that the instruments applied are proper. It can 
therefore be summarized that complying with corporate governance codes, regardless of the 
size of the company, does not have any significant effect on the cost of debt.  
Overall the hypothesis cannot be rejected: 
H0: The relative gain of governance is higher for SMEs than large-cap listed companies  
Analyzing the difference in findings between SMEs and large-cap companies, one 
explanation could that the difference in information available between the two groups of 
companies. The information flow is quite larger for listed large-cap companies, as well as the 
overall transparency. The knowledge regarding SMEs is much more limited. As such, the 
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market seems to value adherence to governance more for the smaller companies, although the 
difference is quite small.  
Finally, the following graphs depict how the governance variables affect the respective 
capital cost when there is a change in the governance strategy, from compliance to non-
compliance. Evidently, the largest effect is for SMEs in relation to WACC, with a change of 
roughly 0.51% on average when the company goes from compliance to non-compliance for 
board composition. Remarkably, for the large-cap listed companies, the average finding is 
that the cost of equity goes up with 0.36% when going from compliance to non-compliance 
for board composition. This finding is clearly not coherent with theory, as compliance should 
not have any negative implications for the companies. Again, the notion of board 
independence may not be seen as value creating by the market.  Perhaps it could be that the 
market does not concur with the formal independence, an argument in line with Bednar 
(2012). However, assigning a penalty in the form of higher cost of equity is still a rather 
strange reaction to adherence of the code.  
  
  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 (top row): Change of WACC (left) and cost of equity (right) when 
complying with corporate governance using panel least squares  
Figure 3 and Figure 4 (bottom row): Change of WACC (left) and cost of equity (right) 
when complying with corporate governance using 2SLS 
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7 Conclusion 
The final chapter of this thesis summarizes the findings in the analysis and concludes the 
results. It further shows fields where future research should be conducted in the future. 
The overall aim of the corporate governance code in Sweden is to increase confidence and 
ensure the flow of risk capital. The interpretation in this study have been that if a company 
chooses to not comply, the overall confidence and flow of risk capital should be lower, and 
consequently have a higher cost of capital. This study finds results both in line and 
inconsistent with previous studies performed in the field. The weighted average cost of 
capital is a decreasing function of adherence to the principles regarding nomination 
committee and board composition, for the overall population. Complying with the principles 
regarding audit- and remuneration committees does not equal a lower cost of capital for the 
same firms. Interestingly, governance has no significant relationship with the cost of debt, 
however with the cost of equity. Dividing the population into groups containing SMEs and 
large-cap listed companies, it is evident that compliance to governance lowers the cost of 
capital for SMEs in a marginally larger extent than for large-cap listed peers. As SMEs are 
less transparent, investors and creditors value governance activities more than for the larger 
corporations. This circumstance seems only fair as the relative effort of complying can be 
viewed as higher for smaller companies compared to the larger ones. The conclusion is 
therefore that there are financial advantages associated with two of the four investigated 
governance variables for the population as a whole. These advantages are specifically 
strongest for SMEs. Overall, the governance circumstance of comply-or-explain could play a 
role how stakeholders value governance. As companies can handle the activities at their own 
discretion, their decision to not comply with a certain section of the code could be viewed by 
the market as the most appropriate for the firm. Furthermore, it is important to point out the 
data issues that potentially could bias the results. For example, one such issue is reverse 
causality. It is difficult to establish the link of causality, that is, if enhanced governance 
activities lead to a lower cost of capital or if a lower cost of capital leads to enhanced 
governance activities.  
The findings of this study contribute to the literature of corporate governance. For 
practitioners, it could be interesting to find out how the market views certain activities and 
how a governance strategy should be formulated, in order to reap the most benefits.  
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7.1 Recommendations for Further Research 
Further research could look deeper into the cost efforts of governance. By qualitatively 
investigating the financial efforts of introducing certain governance functions, a further 
comparison could be made of the pay-offs for adhering to governance. More specifically, 
companies might hesitate to implement certain parts of corporate governance as the costs 
might exceed the benefits, in their view. The costs could include additional remuneration to 
board members, travel costs etc. Combining the research with this thesis can provide 
company leaders with valuable support in the decision-making of whether to implement 
certain parts of the code of corporate governance.  
In addition, research should also turn to enforcement of the code. Yes, the code is flexible in 
nature in terms of compliance. However, when a company chooses not to comply, a clear 
explanation is to be disclosed. This is not found in all cases.  
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Appendix A: Miscellaneous 
 
 
 
Table 7: Overview of the instruments applied in the 2SLS regressions 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: J-test for over-identification on the regressions using 2SLS 
Instrument 1 Instrument 2 Instrument 3 Instrument 4 Instrument 5
WACC
Overall CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 4 + Index 7 Index 4 + Index 9
SME CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 4 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 2 + Index 7 Index 2 + Index 9
Large-Cap CGI Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 9 Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 4 + Index 7 Index 4 + Index 9
Cost of Equity
Overall CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 2 + Index 7 Index 2 + Index 9
SME CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 2 + Index 7 Index 2 + Index 9
Large-Cap CGI Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 9 Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 4 + Index 7 Index 7 + Index 9
Cost of Debt
Overall CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 4 + Index 7 Index 4 + Index 9
SME CGI Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 2 + Index 4 Index 2 + Index 9 Index 4 + Index 9
Large-Cap CGI Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 7 Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 Index 4 + Index 9 Index 7 + Index 9
J-test
WACC
Overall 0.9853
SME 0.2408
Large-Cap 0.5327
Cost of Equity
Overall 0.7989
SME 0.4974
Large-Cap 0.4143
Cost of Debt
Overall 0.5910
SME 0.7863
Large-Cap 0.5960
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix for WACC for all companies observed; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
WACC NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI 
Index 2 + 
Index 4
Ind. 2 * Ind. 
7 * Ind. 9
Index 4 + 
Index 7
Index 4 + 
Index 9
WACC 1.0000
p-value
- - - 
NOMCOM 0.0148 1.0000
p-value 0.6094 - - - 
BOARDCO
-0.0512 0.0118 1.0000
p-value 0.0775 0.6833 - - - 
AUDITCOM
-0.0906 -0.0491 -0.0088 1.0000
p-value 0.0018 0.0906 0.7622 - - - 
REMUNCO
-0.0324 0.0703 0.1075 0.0845 1.0000
p-value 0.2644 0.0153 0.0002 0.0035 - - - 
CGI
-0.0613 0.6172 0.2956 0.5507 0.4568 1.0000
p-value 0.0346 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9
-0.0040 0.1771 0.0097 0.2071 0.3137 0.4092 1.0000
p-value 0.8895 0.0000 0.7390 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 4
-0.0171 0.8704 0.3722 -0.0112 0.1121 0.7416 0.2360 1.0000
p-value 0.5567 0.0000 0.0000 0.6987 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 7
-0.0984 -0.0336 0.4242 0.8705 0.1439 0.6520 0.2462 0.1531 1.0000
p-value 0.0007 0.2466 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 9
-0.0348 0.0560 0.6622 0.0432 0.7848 0.5132 0.2164 0.2953 0.3398 1.0000
p-value 0.2306 0.0533 0.0000 0.1363 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Table 10: Correlation Matrix for cost of equity for all companies observed; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold 
numbers 
 
 
COE NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI Index 2 + Index 4
Ind. 2 * Ind. 
7 * Ind. 9
Index 4 + 
Index 7
Index 2 + 
Index 7
COE 1.0000
p-value
- - - 
NOMCOM
-0.0779 1.0000
p-value 0.0072 - - - 
BOARDCO
-0.1065 0.0118 1.0000
p-value 0.0002 0.6833 - - - 
AUDITCOM
-0.1867 -0.0491 -0.0088 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0906 0.7622 - - - 
REMUNCO 0.0355 0.0703 0.1075 0.0845 1.0000
p-value 0.2215 0.0153 0.0002 0.0035 - - - 
CGI -0.1734 0.6172 0.2956 0.5507 0.4568 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0085 0.1771 0.0097 0.2071 0.3137 0.4092 1.0000
p-value 0.7683 0.0000 0.7390 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 4 -0.1287 0.8704 0.3722 -0.0112 0.1121 0.7416 0.2360 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6987 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 7 -0.1923 0.6879 0.0056 0.6173 0.1303 0.8992 0.3648 0.7104 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.8465 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 7 -0.2108 -0.0336 0.4242 0.8705 0.1439 0.6520 0.2462 0.1531 0.5837 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.2466 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Table 11: Correlation Matrix for cost of debt for all companies observed; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold 
numbers 
 
 
COD NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI Index 2 + Index 4
Ind. 2 * Ind 
7 * Ind.9
Index 4 + 
Index 7
Index 4 + 
Index 9
COD 1.0000
p-value
- - - 
NOMCOM 0.0509 1.0000
p-value 0.1095 - - - 
BOARDCO 0.0107 0.0149 1.0000
p-value 0.7369 0.6390 - - - 
AUDITCOM 0.0784 -0.0328 0.0005 1.0000
p-value 0.0136 0.3029 0.9867 - - - 
REMUNCO
-0.0572 0.0607 0.1214 0.0870 1.0000
p-value 0.0721 0.0565 0.0001 0.0062 - - - 
CGI 0.0652 0.6232 0.3153 0.5622 0.4567 1.0000
p-value 0.0404 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind 7 * Ind.9
-0.0035 0.1900 0.0097 0.2262 0.3332 0.4409 1.0000
p-value 0.9136 0.0000 0.7614 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 4 0.0545 0.8730 0.3892 0.0166 0.1206 0.7555 0.2580 1.0000
p-value 0.0868 0.0000 0.0000 0.6012 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 7 0.0723 -0.0131 0.4472 0.8645 0.1552 0.6707 0.2683 0.1939 1.0000
p-value 0.0230 0.6813 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 9
-0.0265 0.0577 0.6919 0.0539 0.7856 0.5225 0.2320 0.3242 0.3733 1.0000
p-value 0.4047 0.0695 0.0000 0.0899 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix for WACC for SMEs; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
WACC NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI 
Index 2 + 
Index 4
Ind. 2 * Ind. 
4 * Ind. 7
Index 2 + 
Index 9
Index 4 + 
Index 7
WACC 1.0000
p-value - - - 
NOMCOM
-0.0543 1.0000
p-value 0.1109 - - - 
BOARDCO
-0.0506 0.0557 1.0000
p-value 0.1377 0.1025 - - - 
AUDITCOM
-0.0240 -0.0179 -0.0677 1.0000
p-value 0.4823 0.6004 0.0469 - - - 
REMUNCO
-0.0589 0.0595 0.0870 0.0861 1.0000
p-value 0.0842 0.0809 0.0106 0.0115 - - - 
CGI
-0.0624 0.6315 0.2871 0.5547 0.4240 1.0000
p-value 0.0670 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind. 4 * Ind. 9 0.0126 0.1469 0.3781 -0.0089 0.2607 0.2620 1.0000
p-value 0.7125 0.0000 0.0000 0.7942 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 4
-0.0588 0.8666 0.3968 -0.0071 0.1002 0.7522 0.2656 1.0000
p-value 0.0844 0.0000 0.0000 0.8349 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 * Index 7
-0.0038 0.4036 0.0292 0.4253 0.0821 0.5953 0.0843 0.4742 1.0000
p-value 0.9121 0.0000 0.3922 0.0000 0.0159 0.0000 0.0133 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 9
-0.0510 0.8346 0.0629 0.0440 0.4616 0.7961 0.2202 0.8590 0.4763 1.0000
p-value 0.1347 0.0000 0.0648 0.1967 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Table 13: Correlation Matrix for WACC for large-cap companies; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
WACC NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI 
Index 2 + 
Index 4
Avg. Non. 
Com.
Index 4 + 
Index 7
Index 4 + 
Index 9
WACC 1.0000
p-value - - - 
NOMCOM 0.1618 1.0000
p-value 0.0033 - - - 
BOARDCO
-0.0197 -0.1260 1.0000
p-value 0.7222 0.0224 - - - 
AUDITCOM
-0.2059 -0.1361 0.2070 1.0000
p-value 0.0002 0.0136 0.0002 - - - 
REMUNCO 0.0125 0.0946 0.1820 0.0954 1.0000
p-value 0.8210 0.0872 0.0009 0.0846 - - - 
CGI
-0.0019 0.5999 0.3175 0.5176 0.5711 1.0000
p-value 0.9732 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 7
-0.0170 0.6600 0.3058 0.5829 0.2390 0.9282 1.0000
p-value 0.7591 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9
-0.0809 0.1976 -0.0249 0.3191 0.3489 0.5463 0.5092 1.0000
p-value 0.1435 0.0003 0.6531 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 7
-0.1805 -0.1024 0.5280 0.9048 0.2241 0.6433 0.6797 0.4813 1.0000
p-value 0.0010 0.0639 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 9 0.0159 0.0342 0.6229 0.1628 0.8578 0.6172 0.3381 0.2350 0.4143 1.0000
p-value 0.7749 0.5373 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Table 14: Correlation Matrix for cost of equity of SMEs; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
COE NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI Index 2 + Index 4
Ind. 2 * Ind. 
7 * Ind. 9
Index 2 + 
Index 9
Index 2 + 
Index 7
COE 1.0000
p-value
- - - 
NOMCOM
-0.0543 1.0000
p-value 0.1109 - - - 
BOARDCO
-0.0506 0.0557 1.0000
p-value 0.1377 0.1025 - - - 
AUDITCOM
-0.0240 -0.0179 -0.0677 1.0000
p-value 0.4823 0.6004 0.0469 - - - 
REMUNCO
-0.0589 0.0595 0.0870 0.0861 1.0000
p-value 0.0842 0.0809 0.0106 0.0115 - - - 
CGI
-0.0624 0.6315 0.2871 0.5547 0.4240 1.0000
p-value 0.0670 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0126 0.1469 0.3781 -0.0089 0.2607 0.2620 1.0000
p-value 0.7125 0.0000 0.0000 0.7942 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 4
-0.0588 0.8666 0.3968 -0.0071 0.1002 0.7522 0.2656 1.0000
p-value 0.0844 0.0000 0.0000 0.8349 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 7
-0.0454 0.6877 -0.0031 0.6289 0.1141 0.9044 0.1002 0.7083 1.0000
p-value 0.1830 0.0000 0.9280 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0032 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 9
-0.0510 0.8346 0.0629 0.0440 0.4616 0.7961 0.2202 0.8590 0.7211 1.0000
p-value 0.1347 0.0000 0.0648 0.1967 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Table 15: Correlation Matrix for cost of equity of large-cap companies; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold 
numbers 
 
 
COE NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI Index 2 + Index 4
Index 7 + 
Index 9
Index 4 + 
Index 7
Index 2 + 
Index 9
COE 1.0000
p-value
- - - 
NOMCOM
-0.1727 1.0000
p-value 0.0017 - - - 
BOARDCO
-0.1456 -0.1260 1.0000
p-value 0.0083 0.0224 - - - 
AUDITCOM
-0.3279 -0.1361 0.2070 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0136 0.0002 - - - 
REMUNCO 0.0417 0.0946 0.1820 0.0954 1.0000
p-value 0.4514 0.0872 0.0009 0.0846 - - - 
CGI
-0.2904 0.5999 0.3175 0.5176 0.5711 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 7
-0.3757 0.6600 0.3058 0.5829 0.2390 0.9282 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9
-0.1060 0.1976 -0.0249 0.3191 0.3489 0.5463 0.5092 1.0000
p-value 0.0552 0.0003 0.6531 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 7
-0.3289 -0.1024 0.5280 0.9048 0.2241 0.6433 0.6797 0.4813 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0639 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 7 + Index 9
-0.2087 0.0170 0.2184 0.7744 0.6578 0.7758 0.6269 0.6032 0.8135 1.0000
p-value 0.0001 0.7591 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Table 16: Correlation Matrix for cost of debt of SMEs; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
 
COD NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI Index 2 + Index 4
Ind. 2 * Ind 
7 * Ind.9
Index 2 + 
Index 9
Index 4 + 
Index 9
COD 1.0000
p-value
- - - 
NOMCOM
-0.0543 1.0000
p-value 0.1109 - - - 
BOARDCO
-0.0506 0.0557 1.0000
p-value 0.1377 0.1025 - - - 
AUDITCOM
-0.0240 -0.0179 -0.0677 1.0000
p-value 0.4823 0.6004 0.0469 - - - 
REMUNCO
-0.0589 0.0595 0.0870 0.0861 1.0000
p-value 0.0842 0.0809 0.0106 0.0115 - - - 
CGI
-0.0624 0.6315 0.2871 0.5547 0.4240 1.0000
p-value 0.0670 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0276 0.1673 0.0248 0.1763 0.2969 0.3661 1.0000
p-value 0.4181 0.0000 0.4675 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 4
-0.0588 0.8666 0.3968 -0.0071 0.1002 0.7522 0.2656 1.0000
p-value 0.0844 0.0000 0.0000 0.8349 0.0032 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 2 + Index 9
-0.0510 0.8346 0.0629 0.0440 0.4616 0.7961 0.3576 0.8590 1.0000
p-value 0.1347 0.0000 0.0648 0.1967 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 9
-0.0527 0.0649 0.6778 0.0060 0.7574 0.4818 0.2105 0.3048 0.3812 1.0000
p-value 0.1218 0.0569 0.0000 0.8598 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Table 17: Correlation Matrix for cost of debt of large-cap companies; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold 
numbers 
 
 
COD NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO CGI Index 2 + Index 4
Avg. Non. 
Com.
Index 4 + 
Index 7
Index 4 + 
Index 9
COD 1.0000
p-value
- - - 
NOMCOM
-0.1727 1.0000
p-value 0.0017 - - - 
BOARDCO
-0.1456 -0.1260 1.0000
p-value 0.0083 0.0224 - - - 
AUDITCOM
-0.3279 -0.1361 0.2070 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0136 0.0002 - - - 
REMUNCO 0.0417 0.0946 0.1820 0.0954 1.0000
p-value 0.4514 0.0872 0.0009 0.0846 - - - 
CGI
-0.2904 0.5999 0.3175 0.5176 0.5711 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 7
-0.3757 0.6600 0.3058 0.5829 0.2390 0.9282 1.0000
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9
-0.1060 0.1976 -0.0249 0.3191 0.3489 0.5463 0.5092 1.0000
p-value 0.0552 0.0003 0.6531 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 4 + Index 9
-0.0214 0.0342 0.6229 0.1628 0.8578 0.6172 0.3381 0.2350 1.0000
p-value 0.6991 0.5373 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
Index 7 + Index 9
-0.2087 0.0170 0.2184 0.7744 0.6578 0.7758 0.6269 0.6032 0.6266 1.0000
p-value 0.0001 0.7591 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - 
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Appendix C: Reduced Form Regressions 
 
 
Table 18: Impact of CG codes and WACC on Instrumental Variables for all companies; 
statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
Table 19: Impact of CG codes and cost of equity on Instrumental Variables for all 
companies; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
Table 20: Impact of CG codes and cost of debt on Instrumental Variables for all companies; 
statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO WACC Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0405 0.0353 0.0395 0.0330 -0.0230 0.9276 1,003
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2731
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.1714 1,003
p-value 0.0000 0.5237 0.0000 0.0000 0.9645
Index 2 + Index 4 0.1612 0.1407 0.0076 0.0052 -0.0805 0.9060 1,003
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0469 0.2293
Index 4 + Index 7 0.0004 0.0725 0.0761 0.0035 -0.0072 0.9455 1,003
p-value 0.5657 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.7480
Index 4 + Index 9 0.0000 0.0707 -0.0008 0.0599 0.0013 0.9487 1,003
p-value 0.9702 0.0000 0.0780 0.0000 0.9319
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO COE Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0404 0.0353 0.0395 0.0331 -0.0057 0.9276 1,003
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8035
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003 0.0005 0.0013 0.1723 1,003
p-value 0.0000 0.5243 0.0000 0.0000 0.3201
Index 2 + Index 4 0.1610 0.1405 0.0075 0.0054 -0.0855 0.9059 1,003
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0382 0.2378
Index 2 + Index 7 0.0809 -0.0001 0.0799 0.0006 -0.0550 0.9126 1,003
p-value 0.0000 0.9572 0.0000 0.0001 0.1987
Index 4 + Index 7 0.0003 0.0725 0.0761 0.0035 -0.0122 0.9456 1,003
p-value 0.5806 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6113
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO COD Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0408 0.0354 0.0397 0.0319 0.0015 0.9325 975
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8561
Ind. 2 * Ind 7 * Ind.9 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 0.1781 975
p-value 0.0000 0.4587 0.0000 0.0000 0.9012
Index 2 + Index 4 0.1615 0.1402 0.0077 0.0055 0.0030 0.9047 975
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0399 0.9129
Index 4 + Index 7 0.0005 0.0726 0.0760 0.0031 -0.0039 0.9471 975
p-value 0.4445 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.6611
Index 4 + Index 9 0.0003 0.0709 -0.0004 0.0581 0.0053 0.9780 975
p-value 0.2107 0.0000 0.1644 0.0000 0.1843
  
60 Schmidt, Swärdh (2014): Corporate Governance in Sweden – A Success Story? 
 
Table 21: Impact of CG codes and WACC on Instrumental Variables for SMEs; statistically 
significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
Table 22: Impact of CG codes and WACC on Instrumental Variables for large-cap 
companies; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
Table 23: Impact of CG codes and cost of equity on Instrumental Variables for SMEs; 
statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO WACC Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0415 0.0356 0.0396 0.0329 0.0035 0.9126 687
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9109
Ind. 2 * Ind. 4 * Ind. 9 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0010 0.0609 687
p-value 0.0383 0.0000 0.0116 0.7383 0.5474
Index 2 + Index 4 0.1699 0.1380 0.0085 0.0094 -0.0130 0.8902 687
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0110 0.8993
Index 2 * Index 7 0.0074 0.0011 0.0084 0.0009 0.0150 0.3601 687
p-value 0.0000 0.3107 0.0000 0.2532 0.5065
Index 2 + Index 9 0.0844 -0.0031 0.0033 0.0647 -0.0101 0.8777 687
p-value 0.0000 0.2357 0.0230 0.0000 0.8558
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO WACC Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0380 0.0311 0.0393 0.0336 0.0088 0.9734 316
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6927
Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 7 0.1503 0.1280 0.1583 0.0161 -0.0109 0.9697 316
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8921
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0008 0.2549 316
p-value 0.0003 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.7566
Index 4 + Index 7 0.0037 0.0640 0.0792 0.0081 -0.0054 0.9474 316
p-value 0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8921
Index 4 + Index 9 0.0009 0.0696 -0.0005 0.0591 0.0231 0.9592 316
p-value 0.2352 0.0000 0.6249 0.0000 0.3751
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO COE Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0415 0.0356 0.0396 0.0329 -0.0032 0.9127 687
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9193
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0027 0.1465 687
p-value 0.0000 0.8911 0.0000 0.0000 0.0814
Index 2 + Index 4 0.1699 0.1380 0.0084 0.0095 -0.0533 0.8904 687
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0018 0.0103 0.6055
Index 2 + Index 7 0.8361 0.0006 0.0802 0.0058 -0.0439 0.8988 687
p-value 0.0000 0.8382 0.0000 0.0065 0.4632
Index 2 + Index 9 0.0844 -0.0031 0.0033 0.0648 0.0108 0.8779 687
p-value 0.0000 0.2325 0.0233 0.0000 0.8469
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Table 24: Impact of CG codes and cost of equity on Instrumental Variables for large-cap 
companies; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
Table 25: Impact of CG codes and cost of debt on Instrumental Variables for SMEs; 
statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
 
 
Table 26: Impact of CG codes and cost of debt on Instrumental Variables for large-cap 
companies; statistically significant coefficients (5% or better) are shown in bold numbers 
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO COE Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0380 0.0311 0.0393 0.0336 0.0312 0.9734 316
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1876
Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 7 0.1500 0.1279 0.1584 0.0161 -0.0445 0.9698 316
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5994
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0008 0.2571 316
p-value 0.0003 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.7629
Index 4 + Index 7 0.0037 0.6393 0.0792 0.0081 -0.0223 0.9475 316
p-value 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5994
Index 7 + Index 9 0.0092 -0.0183 0.1571 0.1343 0.1250 0.9484 316
p-value 0.0004 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.1876
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO COD Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0419 0.0358 0.0399 0.0313 0.0026 0.9191 662
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8041
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0003 0.1536 662
p-value 0.0000 0.9638 0.0000 0.0000 0.5303
Index 2 + Index 4 0.1707 0.1375 0.0089 0.0099 -0.0017 0.8890 662
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.0107 0.9634
Index 2 + Index 9 0.0851 -0.0030 0.0041 0.0622 0.0026 0.8889 662
p-value 0.0000 0.2397 0.0037 0.0000 0.8891
Index 4 + Index 9
-0.0002 0.0711 -0.0003 0.0572 0.0034 0.9871 662
p-value 0.3938 0.0000 0.2094 0.0000 0.3371
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCOM REMUNCO COD Adj. R2 # observ.
CGI 0.0380 0.0311 0.0393 0.0336 0.0038 0.9733 313
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7101
Ind. 2 + Ind. 4 + Ind. 7 0.1503 0.1282 0.1582 0.0160 -0.0220 0.9696 313
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5496
Ind. 2 * Ind. 7 * Ind. 9 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0009 0.2559 313
p-value 0.0003 0.0068 0.0000 0.0000 0.4280
Index 4 + Index 9 0.0010 0.0696 -0.0006 0.0592 0.0186 0.9594 313
p-value 0.2011 0.0000 0.5584 0.0000 0.1188
Index 7 + Index 9 0.0093 -0.0184 0.1571 0.1343 0.0153 0.9482 313
p-value 0.0004 0.0041 0.0000 0.0000 0.7101
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Table 27: Panel Least Squares estimation for WACC4 
 
 
 
 
Table 28: Panel Least Squares estimation for cost of equity4 
                                                 
4
 Statistically significant results are shown in the following way: 
*** significant on a 1% level 
** significant on a 5% level 
* significant on a 10% level 
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCO
M
REMUNCO Beta D/E M/B Shareholder Size Volatility Adj. R2 # observ.
Overall 0.0015* 0.0015* -0.0003 -0.0015 0.0247*** -0.0003** 0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0012 0.0256** 0.6634 1,003
p-value 0.0549 0.0681 0.7930 0.3072 0.0000 0.0231 0.0095 0.8640 0.3927 0.0159
SME 0.0009 0.0020** -0.0006 -0.0030 0.0271*** -0.0003** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0220** 0.5878 687
p-value 0.2829 0.0480 0.5687 0.2164 0.0000 0.0173 0.0032 0.8009 0.9841 0.0169
Large-Cap 0.0029 -0.0029 0.0018 0.0011 0.0173*** -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0047 -0.0046* 0.0339*** 0.7647 316
p-value 0.1421 0.2572 0.3093 0.5039 0.0008 0.6855 0.7359 0.7553 0.0594 0.0090
CG Variables Control Variables
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCO
M
REMUNCO D/E M/B Shareholder Size Volatility Adj. R2 # observ.
Overall 0.0019* -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0037** -0.0001* 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0034* 0.0228*** 0.7904 1,003
p-value 0.0700 0.6258 0.1787 0.0000 0.0651 0.1917 0.0000 0.0872 0.0001
SME 0.0023 -0.0008 -0.0009 0.0043*** -0.0001** 0.0000** 0.0003*** 0.0027 0.0229*** 0.6285 687
p-value 0.1372 0.6553 0.2684 0.0006 0.0494 0.0402 0.0000 0.2148 0.0005
Large-Cap -0.0002 -0.0036*** -0.0008 0.0025 -0.0020*** 0.0004*** -0.0231*** 0.0072** 0.0281*** 0.8230 316
p-value 0.8516 0.0831 0.5085 0.1086 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0129 0.0005
CG Variables Control Variables
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Table 29: Panel Least Squares estimation for cost of debt4 
  
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCO
M
REMUNCO Beta D/E M/B Shareholder Size Volatility Adj. R2 # observ.
Overall -0.0017 -0.0042 0.0020 0.0002 -0.0041 -0.0003* 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0037 0.0224 0.4970 975
p-value 0.4053 0.3023 0.4578 0.9671 0.4666 0.0605 0.6777 0.6253 0.4672 0.1186
SME -0.0026 -0.0048 0.0020 0.0025 -0.0047 -0.0003** 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0020 0.0170 0.4412 662
p-value 0.2621 0.2662 0.4447 0.7281 0.3855 0.0409 0.5961 0.6913 0.7239 0.1658
Large-Cap 0.0028 -0.0024 0.0006 -0.0012 0.0001 0.0023 -0.0006 0.0047 -0.0098 0.0241 0.5711 313
p-value 0.2518 0.5346 0.8561 0.6752 0.9931 0.1367 0.1416 0.8368 0.1535 0.2239
CG Variables Control Variables
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Table 30: Two-Stage Least-Squares estimation for WACC4 
 
 
 
 
Table 31: Two-Stage Least-Squares estimation for cost of equity4 
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCO
M
REMUNCO Beta D/E M/B Shareholder Size Volatility Adj. R2 # observ.
Overall 0.0022** 0.0018** 0,0008 -0,0027 0.0248*** -0.0003** 0.0001** 0,0000 -0,0012 0.0254** 0,6629 1 003
p-value 0,0105 0,0369 0,5653 0,1300 0,0000 0,0223 0,0105 0,8523 0,3894 0,0166
SME 0,0005 0.0051* -0,0009 -0,0025 0.0271*** -0.0003** 0.0001*** 0,0000 0,0000 0.0220** 0,5866 687
p-value 0,7691 0,0912 0,7037 0,5120 0,0000 0,0245 0,0040 0,8119 0,9991 0,0171
Large-Cap 0,0029 -0,0029 0,0018 0,0011 0.0173*** -0,0007 0,0002 -0,0047 -0.0046* 0.0339*** 0,7647 316
p-value 0,1421 0,2572 0,3093 0,5039 0,0008 0,6855 0,7359 0,7553 0,0594 0,0090
CG Variables Control Variables
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCO
M
REMUNCO D/E M/B Shareholder Size Volatility Adj. R2 # observ.
Overall 0.0021** -0,0011 -0,0014 0.0048*** -0.0001* 0,0000 0.0002*** 0.0034* 0.0230*** 0,7902 1 003
p-value 0,0258 0,5488 0,2946 0,0000 0,0634 0,1901 0,0000 0,0848 0,0001
SME 0.0026* -0,0011 -0,0009 0.0062*** 0.0001** 0.0000** 0.0003*** 0,0028 0.0229*** 0,6278 687
p-value 0,0784 0,5191 0,4197 0,0003 0,0470 0,0425 0,0000 0,2004 0,0006
Large-Cap -0,0002 -0.0036* -0,0008 0,0025 -0.0020*** 0.0004*** -0.0231*** 0.0072** 0.0281*** 0,7190 316
p-value 0,8516 0,0831 0,5085 0,1086 0,0000 0,0001 0,0000 0,0129 0,0005
CG Variables Control Variables
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Table 32: Two-Stage Least-Squares estimation for cost of debt4
NOMCOM BOARDCO AUDITCO
M
REMUNCO Beta D/E M/B Shareholder Size Volatility Adj. R2 # observ.
Overall 0,0018 -0,0014 0,0031 -0,0026 0,0011 -0.0005*** 0.0001** -0,0001 -0.0035*** 0.0246* 0,0415 975
p-value 0,4364 0,7149 0,3864 0,5884 0,6820 0,0000 0,0142 0,2545 0,0000 0,0574
SME 0,0019 -0,0017 0,0043 -0,0029 0,0030 -0.0005*** 0.0001* -0,0001 -0.0030** 0.0232* 0,0149 662
p-value 0,4949 0,6845 0,2242 0,6435 0,2345 0,0000 0,0636 0,2635 0,0188 0,0543
Large-Cap -0,0008 0,0057 -0,0040 -0,0018 -0,0037 0,0004 -0,0001 -0,0093 -0.007088 0,0296 0,0686 313
p-value 0,8006 0,6738 0,5105 0,5297 0,6490 0,7982 0,7829 0,4156 0,1216 0,1015
CG Variables Control Variables
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Appendix E: The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
Table 33: Summary of the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (1/3) 
  
1 The shareholders' meeting
As soon as the time and venue of the shareholders’ meeting have been decided, and no later than in conjunction with the third quarter report, the information 
is to be posted on the company’s website. This information is also to include the closing date for issues to be submitted by shareholders for inclusion in the 
The notice of meeting and other documents relevant to the shareholders’ meeting are to be available in such time and in such a form that they provide 
shareholders with sufficient opportunity to form a well-founded opinion on the issues raised.
The company chair and as many members of the board as are required for a quorum are to be present at shareholders’ meetings. The chief executive 
officer is to attend. At least one member of the company’s nomination committee, at least one of the company’s auditors and, if possible, each member of 
The company’s nomination committee is to propose a chair for the annual general meeting. The proposal is to be presented in the notice of the meeting.
The shareholders’ meeting is to be conducted in Swedish and the material presented is to be available in Swedish. If the ownership structure warrants it, and 
it is financially feasible, the company is to offer simultaneous interpretation into other relevant languages, as well as translation of all or parts of the meeting 
A shareholder, or a representative of a shareholder, who is neither a member of the board nor an employee of the company is to be appointed to verify the 
minutes of the shareholders’ meeting.
The minutes of the latest annual general meeting and any subsequent extraordinary shareholders’ meetings are to be posted on the company’s website. It is 
not necessary to publish the register of voters from the meeting or any attachments containing such information. The minutes are also to be translated from 
Swedish into any other language warranted by the ownership structure, providing this is financially feasible.
2 Appointment and remuneration of the board and statutory auditor
The company is to have a nomination committee. The nomination committee is to propose candidates for the post of chair and other members of the board, 
as well as fees and other remuneration to each member of the board. The nomination committee is also to make proposals on the election and remuneration 
The shareholders’ meeting is to appoint members of the nomination committee or to specify how they are to be appointed. This decision is to include 
procedures for replacing members of the nomination committee who leave before its work is concluded.
The nomination committee is to have at least three members, one of whom is to be appointed committee chair. The majority of the members of the 
nomination committee are to be independent of the company and its executive management. Neither the chief executive officer nor other members of the 
executive management are to be members of the nomination committee. At least one member of the nomination committee is to be independent of the 
company’s largest shareholder in terms of votes or any group of shareholders that act in concert in the governance of the company. 
Members of the board of directors may be members of the nomination committee but may not constitute a majority thereof. Neither the company chair nor 
any other member of the board may chair the nomination committee. If more than one member of the board is on the nomination committee, no more than 
one of these may be dependent of a major shareholder in the company.
The company is to announce the names of members of the nomination committee on its website no later than six months before the annual general meeting. 
If any member has been appointed by a particular owner, that owner’s name is to be stated. If any member leaves the committee, this information is to be 
published. If a new member is appointed to the nomination committee, the corresponding information about the new member is to be provided. The website is 
also to provide information on how shareholders may submit recommendations to the nomination committee.
The nomination committee’s proposals are to be presented in the notice of a shareholders’ meeting where the election of board members or auditor is to be 
held and on the company’s website. When the notice of the shareholders’ meeting is issued, the nomination committee is to issue a statement on the 
company’s website explaining its proposals regarding the  board of directors with regard to the requirements concerning the composition of the board 
contained in Code rule 4.1. If the outgoing chief executive officer is nominated for the post of chair, reasons for this proposal are also to be fully explained.
At a shareholders’ meeting where the election of board members or auditor is to be held, the nomination committee is to give an account of how it has 
conducted its work and explain its proposals. 
3 The tasks of the board of directors
The principle tasks of the board of directors include:
establishing the overall operational goals and strategy of the company,
appointing, evaluating and, if necessary, dismissing the chief executive officer,
ensuring that there is an effective system for follow-up and control of the company’s operations,
ensuring that there is a satisfactory process for monitoring the company’s compliance with laws and other regulations relevant to the company’s 
defining necessary guidelines to govern the company’s ethical conduct,
ensuring that the company’s external communications are characterised by openness, and that they are accurate, reliable and relevant.
The board is to approve any significant assignments the CEO has outside the company.
1.7
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Table 34: Summary of the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (2/3) 
 
  
4 The size and composition of the board
The board is to have a composition appropriate to the company’s operations, phase of development and other relevant circumstances. The board members 
elected by the shareholders’ meeting are collectively to exhibit diversity and breadth of qualifications, experience and background. The company is to strive 
Deputies for directors elected by the shareholders’ meeting are not to be appointed.
No more than one member of the board may be a member of the executive management of the company or a subsidiary.
The majority of the directors elected by the shareholders’ meeting are to be independent of the company and its executive management. A director’s 
independence is to be determined by a general assessment of all factors that may give cause to question the individual’s independence of the company or its 
whether the individual is the chief executive officer or has been the chief executive officer of the company or a closely related company within the last 
whether the individual is employed or has been employed by the company or a closely related company within the last three years,
whether the individual receives a not insignificant remuneration for advice or other services beyond the remit of the board position from the company, a 
closely related company or a person in the executive management of the company, 
whether the individual has or has within the last year had a significant business relationship or other significant financial dealings with the company or a 
closely related company as a client, supplier or partner, either individually or as a member of the executive management, a member of the board or a 
major shareholder in a company with such a business relationship with the company,
whether the individual is or has within the last three years been a partner at, or has as an employee participated in an audit of the company conducted by, 
the company’s or a closely related company’s current or then auditor,
whether the individual is a member of the executive management of another company if a member of the board of that company is a member of the 
executive management of the company, or
whether the individual has a close family relationship with a person in the executive management or with another person named in the points above if that 
person’s direct or indirect business with the company is of such magnitude or significance as to justify the opinion that the board member is not to be 
At least two of the members of the board who are independent of the company and its executive management are also to be independent in relation to the 
company’s major shareholders. In order to determine a board member’s independence, the extent of the member’s direct and indirect relationships with 
major shareholders is to be taken into consideration. A member of the board who is employed by or is a board member of a company which is a major 
shareholder is not to be regarded as independent. In this context, a major shareholder is defined as controlling, directly or indirectly, at least ten per cent of 
the shares or votes in the company. If a company owns more than 50 per cent of the shares, ownership interest or votes in another company, the former is 
Nominees are to provide the nomination committee with sufficient information to enable an assessment of the candidate’s independence as defined in 4.4 and 
Members of the board are to be appointed for a period extending no longer than to the end of the next annual general meeting.
5 The task of directors
Each director is to form an independent opinion on each matter considered by the board and to request whatever information he or she believes necessary 
for the board to make well-founded decisions.
Each director is obliged to acquire the knowledge of the company’s operations, organisation, markets etc., required for the assignment.
6 The chair of the board
The chair of the board is to be elected by the shareholders’ meeting. If the chair relinquishes the position during the mandate period, the board is to elect a 
chair from among its members to serve until the end of the next annual general meeting.
If the chair of the board is an employee of the company or has duties assigned by the company in addition to his or her responsibilities as chair, the division of  
work and responsibilities between the chair and the chief executive officer is to be clearly stated in the board’s statutory Rules of Procedure and its 
The chair is to ensure that the work of the board is conducted efficiently and that the board fulfils its obligations.
7 Board procedures
The board is to review the relevance and appropriateness of its statutory Rules of Procedure, Instruction to the chief executive officer and Reporting 
If the board establishes special committees to prepare its decisions on specific issues, its Rules of Procedure are to specify the duties and decision-making 
powers that the board has delegated to these committees and how the committees are to report to the board. Committees are to keep minutes of their 
An audit committee is to comprise no fewer than three board members. The majority of the members of the committee are to be independent of the 
company and its executive management. At least one of the committee members who are independent of the company and its executive management is also 
The board is to ensure that the company has adequate internal controls and formalised routines to ensure that approved principles for financial reporting and 
internal controls are applied, and that the company’s financial reports are produced in accordance with legislation, applicable accounting standards and other 
At least once a year, the board is to meet the company’s statutory auditor without the chief executive officer or any other member of the executive 
The board of directors is to ensure that the company’s six- or nine-month report is reviewed by the statutory auditor.
The minutes of the board are to provide a clear representation of the matters discussed, the material supporting each item and the substance of the decisions 
taken. The minutes are to be sent to each member of the board as soon as possible following the board meeting.
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Table 35: Summary of the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (3/3) 
 
 
8 Evaluation of the board of directors and the chief executive officer
The board of directors is to evaluate its work annually, using a systematic and structured process, with the aim of developing the board’s working methods 
and efficiency. The results of this evaluation are to be made available to the nomination committee where relevant.
The board is to continuously evaluate the work of the chief executive officer. The board is to examine this issue formally at least once a year, and no 
member of the executive management is to be present during this formal evaluation process.
9 Remmuneration of the board and executive management
The board is to establish a remuneration committee, whose main tasks are to:
prepare the board’s decisions on issues concerning principles for remuneration, remunerations and other terms of employment for the executive 
monitor and evaluate programmes for variable remuneration, both ongoing and those that have ended during the year, for the executive management, and
monitor and evaluate the application of the guidelines for remuneration that the annual general meeting is legally obliged to establish, as well as the current 
remuneration structures and levels in the company.
The chair of the board may chair the remuneration committee. The other shareholders’ meeting-elected members of the committee are to be independent of 
the company and its executive management. Appropriate knowledge and experience of executive remuneration issues is to exist among the members of the 
committee. If the board considers it is more appropriate, the entire board may perform the remuneration committee’s tasks, on condition that no board 
If the remuneration committee or the board uses the services of an external consultant, it is to ensure that there is no conflict of interest regarding other 
assignments this consultant may have for the company or its executive management.
Variable remuneration is to be linked to predetermined and measurable performance criteria aimed at promoting the company’s long term value creation.
Variable remuneration paid in cash is to be subject to predetermined limits regarding the total outcome.
When designing systems for variable remuneration of the executive management that is to be paid in cash, the board is to consider imposing restrictions
which make payment of a certain proportion of the remuneration conditional on whether the performance on which compensation is based proves to be 
which allow the company to reclaim components of remuneration that have been paid on the basis of information which later proves to be manifestly 
The shareholders’ meeting is to decide on all share and share-price related incentive schemes for the executive management. The decision of the 
shareholders’ meeting is to include all the principle conditions of the scheme.
Share- and share-price-related incentive programmes are to be designed with the aim of achieving increased alignment between the interests of the 
participating individual and the company’s shareholders.
Fixed salary during a period of notice and severance pay are together not to exceed an amount equivalent to the individual’s fixed salary for two years.
10 Information on Corporate Governance
In its corporate governance report, the company is to state clearly which Code rules it has not complied with, explain the reasons for each case of non-
compliance and describe the solution it has adopted instead.
As well as the items stipulated by legislation, the following information is to be included in the corporate governance report if it is not presented in the annual 
the composition of the company’s nomination committee. If any member of the committee has been appointed by a particular owner, the name of this 
the information on each member of the board that is required by Code rule 2.6,
the division of work among members of the board and how the work of the board was conducted during the most recent financial year, including the 
number of board meetings held and each member’s attendance at board meetings,
the composition, tasks and decision-making authority of any board committees, and each member’s attendance at the respective committee’s meetings,
for the CEO
age, principal education and work experience,
significant professional commitments outside the company, and
holdings of shares and other financial instruments in the company or similar holdings by related natural or legal persons, as well as shareholdings and 
part ownership in enterprises with which the company has significant business relations,
any infringement of the stock exchange rules applicable to the company, or any breach of good practice on the securities market reported by the relevant 
exchange’s disciplinary committee or the Swedish Securities Council during the most recent financial year.
The company is to have a section of its website devoted to corporate governance matters, where the company’s three most recent corporate governance 
reports are to be posted, together with that part of the audit report which deals with the corporate governance report or the auditor’s written statement on the 
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